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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JOHN PETER KIRILUK,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Priority No. 15

Case No. 970200-CA

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

QUESTION PRESENTED
Should this Court delete dicta in its opinion suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda
violation must be treated as a constitutional violation for purposes of prejudicial error
analysis?
RELIEF REQUESTED
This petition does not seek to alter the reasoning or result in this case. Rather, it
asks the Court to delete dicta in the fourth sentence in the second full paragraph on page 5
of the Court's opinion, and insert the following:
A Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional violation. State v.
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah). However, even if the instant violation
rose to the level of a constitutional violation, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
See State v. Kiriluk, No. 971200-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah Ct. App. December 10, 1998)
(addendum).

The State recognizes that this petition for rehearing is not timely under Rule 35(a),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requiring the petition to be filed "within 14 days after
the entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order."
The Court's opinion in Kiriluk, was issued on 10 December 1998. However, Rule 2,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows the Court for "extraordinary cause" to
"suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case" and
"order proceedings . . . in accordance with its direction." The State therefore further
requests that the Court invoke rule 2 here to suspend the requirements of Rule 35(a) and
grant the instant petition upon the "extraordinary cause" demonstrated below.1

l

The State is also filing motion to stay the remittitur and to extend the time for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court in the event this Court
declines to grant the petition for rehearing. The State is not simultaneously seeking
remedies in both courts, but is only concerned to preserve the right to certiorari review
should the Court decline the instant petition.
2

ARGUMENT
DICTA SUGGESTING THE NONCOERCIVE MIRANDA
VIOLATION EQUATED WITH A CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION SHOULD BE DELETED BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY
TO STATE V. TROYER, 910 P.2D 1182 (Utah 1995)
This case involved the standard to be applied in reviewing a noncoercive Miranda
violation. Ultimately, the Court declined to determine whether defendant's Miranda
rights were violated, affirming the jury verdict on the ground that any Miranda violation
was not prejudicial. See Kiriluk, slip op. at 5. In so doing, this Court set forth the
standard for reviewing constitutional error recognized in State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d
1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628-29,
113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993)) (requiring State to establish error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt). See Kiriluk, slip op. at 5.
The Court's reliance in dicta on the Morrison/Brecht constitutional error standard
is problematic because the Utah Supreme Court has held that a noncoercive Miranda
violation such as occurred here does not equate with a constitutional violation. State v.
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1995). Generally, non-constitutional errors are
reversible unless harmless; while constitutional errors are reversible unless harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. While Morrison and Brecht do involve M/randa-related
issues, unlike the present case, Morrison and Brecht deal with the improper use at trial of
a defendant's post-Miranda silence, a violation of due process, or constitutional error.

3

Morrison, 937 P.2d atl296; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629. Brecht recognizes that the rule of
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), that the prosecution may not introduce evidence
of a defendant's post-Miranda silence, is not a mere "prophylactic rule" like Miranda, but
rather, "fits squarely into the category of constitutional violations . . . characterized as
'trial error.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 409 U.S. 279, 307
(1991)). Thus, Kiriluk's dicta suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda violation by itself
must be treated as a constitutional violation for purposes of prejudicial error analysis is
incorrect.2
Accordingly, the State requests the Court to delete dicta suggesting that a
noncoercive Miranda violation equates with a constitutional violation for purposes of
prejudicial error analysis. Specifically, the State proposes that the second full paragraph
on pages five and six of the opinion be amended as follows:
Defendant contends that even under Mosley, his Miranda rights were
violated. The issue is whether, after his invocation, the continued questioning in the first
interview and the discussion of the same crime in the second interview makes Mosley
inapplicable because defendant's Miranda rights were not "scrupulously honored" in the
first interview. This is a question we need not answer because we conclude that, even if
defendant's Miranda rights were violated, this violation was not prejudicial.
We recognize that a Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional
violation. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah). However, even if
the instant violation rose to the level of a constitutional violation, it was
harmless bevond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293,
1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

2

The Court's error may have been driven by the State's imprecise citation to
Morrison as the applicable standard in the Brief of Appellee at p. 27.
4

628-29, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717(1993)). "In evaluating whether an
evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we focus on
'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction.9" Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).
"This higher standard does not require reversal solely because we might
imagine a single juror whose decision hinged on [defendant's] confession.
Rather, 'we look to what seems to us to have been the probable impact of
the confession on the minds of the average juror.'" State v. Villarreal, 889
P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
254, 89 S.Ct 1726, 1728 (1969)).
A number of factors determine whether an error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, including "the importance of the
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case."
Id. at 4251-26 (citations omitted).
Kiriluk, slip op. at 5-6 (insertions added). This change will not affect the reasoning or
result in this case, but will prevent the opinion from conflicting with Troyer.
CONCLUSION
The Court should delete dicta suggesting that a noncoercive Miranda violation
equates with a constitutional violation for purposes of review for prejudicial error
analysis.

5

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J(Q_ January 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

IAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were
mailed by first-class mail this vO January 1999 to:
LINDA M. JONES
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

DEC 1 01998
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No- 971200-CA

John Peter Kiriluk,
F I L E D
(December 10, 1998)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant John Kiriluk appeals his conviction of criminal
homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1997). We affirm.
FACTS
"In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
to the verdict. We recite the facts accordingly." State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).
However, we are mindful that we must determine if the evidence
relied upon by the jury "is so compelling that we can conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the
same verdict." State v. Dahlguist. 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); £££ State V. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah
1989) (A "reviewing court is to decide whether, considering all
the evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have decided the case differently.") (citation omitted)).

Defendant and the victim were involved in the formulation
and sale of methamphetamine. The victim served a variety of
functions for defendant, including that of courier between
defendant and others involved in the drug trade. In his last
assignment, defendant gave the victim a large quantity of
precursor to deliver to a methamphetamine "cook,"1 and told him
to return the finished product. The finished methamphetamine was
never returned and the victim was unable to produce the missing
precursor. Defendant was upset with the victim for losing the
precursor and concerned for his own well-being because defendant
owed money to his suppliers. Defendant confronted the victim
about the missing precursor, struck the victim in the face, and
threatened the victim's life. Following this assault, defendant,
the victim, and a number of other eventual codefendants left
defendant's house in a car, ostensibly to search for the missing
precursor. Defendant and the vehicle's occupants ended up in a
remote area of Bluffdale, Utah. Defendant, the victim, and a
third male occupant, Damon Mumford, who had met the victim only
that day, exited the vehicle. Defendant took a knife from one of
the female passengers, and the three men walked a short distance
away. Approximately thirty minutes later, only defendant and
Damon returned to the vehicle with a bloody knife and some of the
victim's possessions. Defendant, Damon, and the others returned
to defendant's apartment where defendant partially burned the
victim's possessions, and directed two of the women to finish the
job.
The victim's body was found on March 22, 1998. Because
defendant was one of the last people seen with the victim, police
visited his apartment on the night of March 25, 1998. Upon
arrival, the police saw drug paraphernalia in plain view. While
some officers remained at the apartment, defendant agreed to
accompany other officers to the police station for questioning.
At the police station, officers interviewed defendant two
separate times, and provided him with Miranda warnings at the
outset of both interviews. In the first interview, the officers
initially focused their questioning on the homicide. However,
after receiving a phone call about drugs found in defendant's
apartment, the focus changed and the police began to discuss the
drugs. At this point, defendant unequivocally invoked his right
to remain silent, but the police continued to briefly question
him about the drugs. Around the same time, and after invoking
his Miranda rights, defendant consented to a search of his
apartment. Thereafter, the first interview ended.

1. "Precursor" can be one of several ingredients necessary for
the production of methamphetamine.
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Two hours later, officers again questioned defendant. In
the second interview, the officers questioned defendant only
about the homicide. Defendant did not invoke his right to remain
silent in this interview and openly discussed his version of the
incidents leading up to the homicide. Initially, defendant told
the officers that the victim was taken away by some "Mexicans"
and killed. Defendant later switched stories and claimed that
Damon led the victim away and returned alone, stating: "It's
done." Defendant was later charged with and convicted of
criminal homicide and now appeals.
ANALYSIS
I.

Violation of Defendant's Miranda Rights

Defendant first argues that the police violated his Miranda
rights when, after invoking his right to remain silent, he was
questioned a second time the same night. We review this alleged
constitutional violation under a correction of error standard.
£££ State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
As a threshold matter, we disagree with defendant's
contention that he invoked his right to counsel. Defendant
initially waived his Miranda rights at the outset of the first
interview. He asserts, however, that when the interview topic
switched to drugs, he invoked his right to counsel and thus the
officer was obligated to cease his questioning. Our supreme
court has clearly articulated the standard for a postwaiver
invocation of counsel:
[0]nce a suspect has clearly, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights,

[Davis v, United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 s.
Ct. 2350 (1994)], places the requirement of
clarity with respect to postwaiver invocation
of those rights on the suspect. As the
majority in Davis describes it, the suspect
"must articulate his desire to have counsel
present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney."
State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (quoting Davisf 512
U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355). Here, in the context of the
colloquy between defendant and the interviewing officer,
defendant fails the Davis test.

971200-CA
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Q.
Okay, Uh, back at the apartment there
has been some narcotics found and some drugs
found, okay? Also at the apartment, while
they were there, people came up and were
startin to make buys, right, right then and
there while, while uh, my Sergeant and some
other, uh, cops were there. Okay? Now this
happened inside your apartment- You're going
to be arrested for that, okay? Now, do, do
you want any, make any statements in regard
to that- Keep, keeping in mind everything
about you do have the right to remain silent.
You do have the right to have to have an
attorney, things of that nature. (Det. Carr)
A:
Are you arresting me? (Inaudible) (John
Kiriluk)

Q:
I'm not going to bullshit ya here.
That's what the call was about, okay? The
Sergeant said while they were there they've
arrested four people there. Four people that
have come up there, tried to make buys,
someone came up with a bottle of pills,
things of that nature, okay? But apparently
there was some dope found actually at your
apartment. Okay? Now that in and of itself
is enough for possession. Bare minimal
possession. There's not sayin that you're
dealin, okay? But that's bare minimal
possession. Okay? And that's, and that's
what you'd be lookin at right now, so again.

do you want to make any statements in that
regard to anything that goesr went on in your
apartment that has to do with the drugs that
were found there? (Det. Carr)
A:

I don't. (John Kiriluk)

(Emphasis added.) Defendant's argument that he invoked his right
to counsel hinges on his response "I don't," when asked whether
he wanted to make any statements regarding drugs found in his
apartment. This statement is insufficient, in any light, to
suggest to the interviewing officer that he should have ceased
his questioning because defendant was invoking his right to
counsel. Thus, we do not further address this argument.
In Michigan v. Moseleyf 423 U.S. 96, 102-03, 96 S. Ct. 321,
326 (1975), the United State Supreme Court held that its decision
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in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), did
not create "a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any
further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once
the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent."
(Footnote omitted.) In Mosely, the defendant was arrested in
connection with a series of robberies and was advised of his
Miranda rights before a first interview concerning the robberies
commenced. See Moseleyf 423 U.S. at 97, 96 S. Ct. at 323.
Mosely told the officers that he did not wish to answer any
questions concerning the robberies and the officers immediately
stopped their questioning. See id. Later that afternoon, Mosely
was again given his Miranda rights and then interviewed by a
different officer concerning an unrelated homicide, and confessed
to participating in the homicide. See id. at 98, 96 S. Ct. at
324. Mosely later moved to suppress his statements concerning
the homicide, arguing that the officers were barred from asking
him any further questions after he had invoked his right to
remain silent. See id.
In reversing the Michigan Court of Appeals1 conclusion that
Moselyfs Miranda rights were violated, the Supreme Court noted
there was no per se proscription against further questioning, and
concluded that "the admissibility of statements obtained after
the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends, under
Miranda, on whether his 'right to cut off questioning1 was
'scrupulously honored.'" JJL. at 104, 96 S. Ct. at 326 (footnote
omitted). The Court looked at a number of factors in concluding
no Miranda violation occurred: that the questioning abruptly
ended when Mosely invoked his right to remain silent; that two
hours passed before a different officer interviewed Mosely about
a different crime; and that Mosely was given his full Miranda
rights at the outset of the second interview. See id. at 104-05,
96 S. Ct. at 327. Thus, the Court concluded that "[t]he
subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosely1s previous
decision not to answer [the officer's] inquiries." Id.
Defendant contends that even under Mosely. his Miranda
rights were violated. The issue is whether, after his
invocation, the continued questioning in the first interview and
the discussion of the same crime in the second interview makes
Mosely inapplicable because defendant's Miranda rights were not
"scrupulously honored" in the first interview. This is a
question we need not answer because we conclude that, even if
defendant's Miranda rights were violated, this violation was not
prejudicial. "To establish that this error did not prejudice
defendant, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the
improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 628-29, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993)). "In evaluating whether an evidentiary
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error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we focus on
'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" Id. at
1296 (citation omitted). "This higher standard does not require
reversal solely because we might imagine a single juror whose
decision hinged on [defendant's] confession. Rather, 'we look to
what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the
confession on the minds of the average juror.'" State v.
ViUaKTeal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995) (quoting Harrington v.
California. 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1728 (1969)).
A number of factors determine whether an
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
including "the importance of the witness'
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether
the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence collaborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of
course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case."
Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
We conclude that the testimony from the second interview of
which defendant complains was primarily cumulative, and harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer who interviewed defendant
testified that: defendant claimed he did not kill the victim;
defendant was "visibly shaken" when a tree limb from the murder
scene was produced at the start of the second interview;
defendant had earlier threatened to kill the victim; defendant
had twice struck the victim before the murder; and defendant gave
at least three different versions of events the night of the
murder.
However, all the testimony in question came from other state
witnesses, with the exception of defendant's reaction when shown
the tree branch at the second interview. We do not believe that
defendant's "shaken" reaction, alone, is sufficient to constitute
prejudice. Furthermore, the testimony elicited had little
importance in the State's case because its case against defendant
was otherwise strong: Defendant was angry at the victim for
losing a substantial quantity of methamphetamine precursor and
had both struck and threatened to kill the victim; defendant and
codefendant Damon Mumford were the two last people seen with the
victim; Damon had only met the victim that same day and was
present as "muscle" to intimidate the victim; defendant returned
with a bloody knife and the victim's possessions; and finally
defendant later partially burned the victim's personal effects
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and directed others to complete the burning. Thus, we conclude
the trial courtfs denial of defendant's Motion to Suppress does
not constitute prejudicial error because the State's case, absent
the testimony in question, was compelling beyond a reasonable
doubt•
II.

Was Consent to Search Defendant's
Apartment Voluntary?

Next, defendant argues that a consent to search his
apartment was per se involuntary because it was obtained after
his Miranda rights were violated and thus requires the
suppression of the post-violation evidence. "[A] trial court's
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary
is to be reviewed for correctness. The trial court's underlying
factual findings will not be set aside unless they are found to
be clearly erroneous." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271
(Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
Utah courts have not addressed this issue, but there is
ample authority from other state and federal jurisdictions
holding that a consent to search is not an incriminating
statement for Fifth Amendment purposes. In United States v.
Rodriguez-Garcia. 983 F.2d 1563 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant
was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to remain
silent. See id. at 1566. The officers, however, still sought
and obtained his consent to search two vehicles and a storage
unit. See id. The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's argument
that his Miranda rights were violated by the officers seeking his
consent:
[A] consent to search is not the type of
incriminating statement which the Fifth
Amendment was designed to address.
Consenting to a search is not "evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature" which
would require officers to first present a
Miranda warning. . . . We hold that
Rodriguez' voluntary consent to the searches
. . . was unaffected by the invocation of his

Miranda rights.
Id. at 1568.2
2. £££ United States v. Smith. 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.
1993), ("We have held that a consent to search is not a selfincriminating statement, and, therefore, does not amount to
interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every
(continued...)
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We conclude the voluntariness of defendant's consent was
unaffected by his invocation of Miranda. Thus, we affirm the
trial court's conclusion that defendant's consent to search his
apartment was voluntary.3
III.

Rimmasch or Competency Claims on Appeal

Defendant next complains the trial court erred in allowing a
State witness to testify that substances seized at his apartment
were methamphetamine precursor.
At trial, defendant objected on foundational grounds to a
detective's testimony that it was the detective's opinion
precursor to methamphetamine was found in jars in defendant's
apartment. See Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 442-43
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (outlining test for admitting lay testimony
and circumstantial evidence used to identify narcotics). On
appeal, he challenges the testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence
702 and State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) and State v.
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996). However, even if we were to
hold that defendant preserved his objection and that the evidence
2. (...continued)
court of appeals to address the issue."), cert, denied. Smith v.

United States, 5io U.S. ioei (1994); Cody v, Solem, 755 F.2d
1323, 1339 (8th Cir.) (holding Miranda violation does not
invalidate consent to search as Fifth Amendment only protects
"testimonial and communicative" evidence), cert, denied. 474 U.S.
833 (1985); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) (same); People v. Alvarado. 644 N.E.2d 783, 786-89 (111.
App. Ct. 1994) (holding Miranda violation does not vitiate
voluntary consent)), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 419 (111. 1995);
State v. Juarez. 903 P.2d 241, 246 (N.M. Ct. App.) ("[A] request
for consent to search is not, by itself an interrogation, just as
a consent to search is not an incriminating response."), cert,
denied. 899 P.2d 1138 (N.M. 1995).
3. Defendant also asserts that his consent to search was invalid
because it was obtained by the exploitation of a Miranda
violation. His claim is not well founded. "[T]he exploitation
analysis . . . is triggered only if the prior illegality is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262
(citing New York v. Harris. 495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S. Ct. 1640,
1643-44 (1990)) (additional citations omitted). Although in his
initial pleading, defendant asserted that the prior illegality
was the warrantless entry into his apartment, both at trial and
on appeal he complains only of the alleged Miranda violation as
the prior illegality. Thus, an exploitation analysis is
inappropriate and we decline to address it further.
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should have been excluded, again we simply cannot conclude the
detectivefs opinion that the jar contained precursor was
prejudicial. The detective admitted in cross-examination that
the field tests of the substance in the jar were inconclusive.
Further, there was ample evidence that the defendant and the
victim were in a dispute over the victim's loss of precursor
given to him by defendant. Finally, the prosecutor introduced
testimony that: Defendant was angry with the victim about the
missing precursor; defendant owed his suppliers money for the
precursor; and that defendant both struck the victim and
threatened his life because of the missing precursor. Thus, "we
can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
reached the same verdict" without hearing the detectivefs
testimony. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 867.
IV.

Motion for Mistrial

Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his Motion for a Mistrial. "A trial
court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and
its decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion. A defendant has the burden of persuading this court
that the conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome of the
trial." State v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(citations omitted), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); see
State v. Workman. 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) ("[T]he denial of
motion for a mistrial does not constitute an abuse of discretion
where no prejudice to the accused is shown.").
Here, defendant complains that the State violated Rule 16 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to provide him
with the serology test conducted on a codefendant's t-shirt for
the victim's blood.4 Assuming for purposes of this argument
4. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in
pertinent part:
(a) [T]he prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material
or information of which he has knowledge:
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and (5)
any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the
(continued...)
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only, that a discovery violation did occur, we conclude that
defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by not
having a copy of the serology report. The trial court correctly
pointed out that either a positive or negative result of the test
on the codefendantfs t-shirt would have no bearing because the
evidence had already established that both defendant and the
codefendant were present at the time of the victim1s death.
Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced because he was
unable to review the serology test methodology. We agree with
the trial court that because the test results are not prejudicial
to defendant, similarly not knowing the test methodology is
equally nonprejudicial. We therefore conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's Motion
for a Mistrial.
V.

Curative Instruction

Defendant also argues that the trial courtfs failure to
provide a curative instruction regarding hearsay testimony which
was admitted without objection is grounds for reversal.
Specifically, defendant complains the trial court erred when it
allowed Rebecca Mumford, a codefendant, to testify that her
husband Damon told her defendant murdered the victim. We
disagree. Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c).
In State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996), this court held
that "[b]ecause defendant failed to object to the instruction at
trial, we can reach the issue only to avoid manifest injustice.
(Citation omitted.) However, the manifest injustice exception
has no application in cases in which the defendant invited the
4.

(...continued)
defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a).
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very error complained of on appeal." Earlier, in State v.
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987), our supreme court held
that a defendant failed to preserve his objection to jury
instructions when "he proposed no jury instruction . . . [and] he
registered no objection to the instructions which the court
gave." The Hoffman court thus held the objection to the jury
instructions was not properly preserved and declined to address
it on appeal. See id, at 504; see also State v. Swan. 928 P.2d
933, 935 (Mont. 1996) (citation omitted) ("[T]his Court will not
predicate error upon the failure to give an instruction when the
party alleging the error failed to offer the instruction.");
MI

Etcheverry v, State, 821 P.2d 350, 351 (Nev. 1991) ( [T]he

failure to object or to request special instruction to the jury
precludes appellate consideration.1 '[lit was incumbent on him
to prepare such an instruction and request the court give it.1")
(citation omitted); James v. State. 817 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1991) ("This Court has repeatedly held that a
defendant must object to the instruction and must submit written
requested instructions should he not be satisfied with the
instructions of the court.").
Defendant failed either to object to the jury instructions
or to provide the trial court with a curative instruction on the
hearsay testimony. The trial court specifically told defendant's
counsel: "I will invite you to provide me an instruction that we
can deal with when we finally instruct the jury." However,
counsel never provided such a curative instruction, and before
the jury instructions were given to the jury, the trial court
noted that:
Court:
requested
that came
as to the
waived.

There was never presented to me any
instruction regarding the issue
up during the course of the trial
hearsay. And so I assume it's

Counsel: And I had intended with our
instruction on the informer/benefit to the
witness testimony to make that--to make an
argument based on that instruction that I had
submitted.
Court:
Qkay» And that was never
presented, All right.
(Emphasis added.) The facts here are similar to those in
Blubaugh. in which the defendant also failed to either object to
the jury instructions or to provide a curative instruction for
the alleged error. See 904 P.2d at 700. We likewise decline to
address the question of whether there has been a manifest
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injustice because the "[defendant] invited the very error
complained of on appeal.If Id. Thus we conclude defendant waived
any claimed error in the instructions given.5
CONCLUSION
In sum, we uphold defendant's conviction of criminal
homicide. First, we do not reach the question of whether
defendant's Miranda rights were violated because we conclude that
any violation was not prejudicial. Second, we conclude
defendant's consent to a search of his apartment was voluntary,
and not per se coercive, despite any Miranda violation. Third,
the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it allowed
a police detective to testify as to his belief that a jar in
defendant's apartment contained methamphetamine precursor.
Fourth, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied defendant's Motion for a Mistrial. Next, because
defendant neither objected to the jury instructions given nor
provided a curative instruction concerning alleged hearsay
testimony, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible
error when it failed to give a curative instruction. Finally,
because defendant's several claims of error are without merit or
have been waived, there is no cumulative error.

C^udith M. Billings, J u d g ^
WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge

5. Finally, defendant argues we should reverse his conviction
under the cumulative error doctrine. Because we conclude
defendant's several claims of error on appeal have been waived or
are without merit, our confidence in the trial court's verdict is
not undermined. See State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah
1998) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)).
We thus conclude there is no cumulative error.

971200-CA

12

